CENTER for MEDICAL INTEROPERABILITY

The Center for Medical Interoperability Specification Automated Secure Update Mechanism Framework

CMI-SP-F-ASUM-D02-2019-05-31

Draft

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Work in Progress	An incomplete document designed to guide discussion and generate feedback that may include several alternative requirements for consideration.
Draft	A document considered largely complete but lacking review by Members and vendors. Drafts are susceptible to substantial change during the review process.
Issued	A generally public document that has undergone Member and Technology Supplier review, cross-vendor interoperability, and is for Certification testing if applicable. Issued Specifications are subject to the Engineering Change Process.
Closed	A static document, reviewed, tested, validated, and closed to further engineering change requests to the specification through The Center.

1 Scope

1.1 Introduction and Purpose

This document establishes a foundational framework for automated secure update of clients, built on The Center's architecture. The purpose is to establish a set of technology-agnostic foundational requirements to be realized via different ASUM solutions that will specify the protocols, message exchanges, and related requirements.

1.2 Requirements

Throughout this document, the words that are used to define the significance of particular requirements are capitalized. These words are:

"SHALL"	This word means that the item is an absolute requirement of this specification.
"SHALL NOT"	This phrase means that the item is an absolute prohibition of this specification.
"SHOULD"	This word means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
"SHOULD NOT"	This phrase means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the listed behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described with this label.
"MAY"	This word means that this item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.

2 References

2.1 Normative References

In order to claim compliance with this specification, it is necessary to conform to the following standards and other works as indicated, in addition to the other requirements of this specification. Notwithstanding, intellectual property rights may be required to use or implement such normative references.

All references are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this specification are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the documents listed below.

[IETF-RFC5246]	The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246
[IHE-PCD]	Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) Patient Care Device (PCD) https://www.ihe.net/Patient_Care_Devices/
[OWASP]	Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) https://owasp.org/
[CMI-SP-F-ID]	Identity https://medicalinteroperability.org/specifications
[CMI-SP-F-PF]	Provisioning Flows https://medicalinteroperability.org/specifications

2.2 Informative References

This specification does not provide any informative references.

[CMI-DOC-TD]	Terms and Definitions https://medicalinteroperability.org/specifications

2.3 Reference Acquisition

Center for Medical Inteoperability, 8 City Boulevard, Suite 203 | Nashville, TN 37209; Phone +1-615-257-6410; http://medicalinteroperability.org/

3 Terms and Definitions

This specification uses the terms and definitions in [CMI-DOC-TD].

4 Abbreviations and Acronyms

This specification uses the following abbreviations:

API	**Application Programming Interface**
ASUM	Automated Secure Update Mechanism
CMI	Center For Medical Interoperability
IP	Internet Protocol
NTP	Network Time Protocol
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator

5 Overview

The Automated Secure Update Mechanism, or ASUM, framework describes the process by which software is updated on clients in an interoperable manner. Software may be updated for a variety of reasons: e.g., feature enhancements, bug fixes, and cybersecurity threats, among others. The nomenclature, ASUM, reflects the direction of The Center's members for the process to be secure, automated, and interoperable across clients from different vendors.

Software update mechanisms currently range from manual processes to vendor-specific automation. A client's software architecture can also vary. Clients can use third-party operating systems (e.g., Microsoft® Windows®, Linux®), customized third-party operating systems, or vendor-specific operating systems. The client application software component – the portion that performs the medical functions – may be tightly coupled with the underlying operating system (e.g., co-compiled) or be a separate application. The application software component may be a monolithic image, be part of a multi-component design, have various sub-components, etc. This client application software component may or may not support network connections (e.g., via Internet Protocol, or IP). Even when a network connection exists, there may be cases where it should not be updated (e.g., when the client is operational) or cannot be updated (e.g., failures that require manual intervention).

5.1 Scope

To address the myriad of possibilities of client architectures, the members have recommended an iterative approach to ensuring interoperable, secure, automated updates. Only clients that are networked and accessible via an IP network are in scope. Updates include both cybersecurity and functional upates of client application software components, whether coupled with operating systems or independent of them. This foundational specification applies to both devices and gateways, though initial ASUM solution specifications will be focused on clients that are gateways. Updates particular to clients that are devices will be specified in the future.

This document specifies the first iteration of a normative framework for ASUM. The components of this iteration can be broadly categorized into the following:

a) Communications between a logical 'ASUM management entity' and the client

- Includes mechanisms to obtain relevant information from the client, indicate the availability of software to the client, and for the client to report the status of an update attempt.
- These communications are specified as ASUM solutions and are documented separately, each using a specific protocol such as IHE PCD.

b) Transport protocol to obtain the software update

- Includes the process by which the client securely obtains a software image.
- These requirements are specified in this document.
- In this iteration, client implementations that are verified to meet the software update transport requirements are exempt from implementing this specific update mechanism.

Finally, the mechanism for the health system to obtain available software updates from manufacturers for their deployed clients is an important step. However, it is deemed out of scope for this iteration.

5.2 Framework Components

The primary framework components are the ASUM management entity, the software repository, and the client. In addition, vendors may support a vendor software update server, a network component that provides automated communications to the healthcare facility. Outside of the client, all other network components are deemed to be logical in nature. These logical network components can be implemented within other backoffice components or as standalone solutions.

The interface requirements between the client and the ASUM management entity, and the client and the software repository, are specified in this document. The interactions between the healthcare facility and the vendor software update server are out of scope for this iteration. Figure 1 illustrates the scope of this framework iteration.



Figure 1. Framework Scope

5.3 Deployment Scenarios

The framework components and the interfaces in this document can support multiple deployment scenarios. A few deployment examples are illustrated in the following diagrams. The framework is not prescriptive about which option should be used, and the Center expects health systems will use a hybrid of the illlustrated deployment scenarios. Members have indicated a desire to iteratively move towards the example shown in Figure 2 over time. An ideal scenario envisons an update to this, wherein all of the interfaces are consistent and interoperable.

The deployment example in Figure 2 illustrates the scenario where all the clients support the interoperable interface for communication with the ASUM management entity. It also assumes that these clients support an interoperable interface that can be realized via a single software repository. This may be based on compliance with the software update transport mechanism described by the framework or via a software repository that implements all of the various software update transport options.



Figure 2. Deployment Option Example A

Figure 3 showcases the deployment scenario with a single ASUM management entity and vendor-specific software repositories that implement the corresponding client supported software update transport mechanism. There is a variation of this deployment scenario in which there is no software repository within the Healthcare Facility for a given vendor system.



Figure 3. Deployment Option Example B

Figure 4 illustrates a deployment scenario with multiple management entities and associated vendor-specific software repositories that implement the corresponding client supported software update transport mechanisms.



Figure 4. Deployment Option Example C

6 ASUM Framework Requirements

This section provides the normative framework requirements for CMI-specified ASUM solutions. For this iteration, requirements are provided for two interfaces: a) client and the ASUM management entity; and, b) client and a software repository. This section presents requirements that need to be met by ASUM solutions, and other relevant considerations related to the scope.

6.1 Trust Management

6.1.1 Code Verification Signing Requirement

Code verification signing SHALL use identities (certificates and keys) issued by The Center that comply with [CMI-SP-F-ID].

6.1.2 CMI Certificate Exclusivity Requirement

Only CMI issued certificates SHALL be used.

6.1.3 CVC Requirement

Code Verification Certificates (CVCs) SHALL be issued to vendors and hospitals for signing images.

6.1.4 CMI Certificate Secure Channel Requirement

Clients and management entities SHALL use CMI medical device, platform, and server certificates to implement secure channels for the automated secure update function, to include software transport.

6.1.5 Credential Change Prohibition Requirement

Credentials (certificate and keys) SHALL NOT be changed through the ASUM processes. Any update that requires the client to change or renew identity is not in scope at this time.

6.2 Client and ASUM Management Entity Communications

6.2.1 ASUM Solutions Protocol Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL specify the protocol and interoperability requirements for communications between the ASUM management entity and the client.

6.2.2 ASUM Solutions Automated Discovery Requirement

To initiate such communications, the ASUM solution SHALL specify an automated mechanism for the client to discover the ASUM management entity.

6.2.3 ASUM Solutions Communication Authentication and Encryption Requirement

All ASUM solution communications SHALL be authenticated and encrypted using keys and certificates issued by The Center.

6.2.4 ASUM Solutions Client Information Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL specify what the client needs to communicate (e.g., client software version) to the ASUM management entity.

6.2.5 ASUM Solutions Client Shared Mechanism Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL specify how this information is shared from the client to the ASUM management entity. ASUM solutions MAY consider a management-pull, client-push, or both.

6.2.6 ASUM Solutions Notification Mechanism Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL also specify the notification mechanism by means of which the client is indicated to update software.

6.2.7 ASUM Client NTP Requirement

Clients that comply with this Framework SHALL always use time obtained via NTP for time communications, unless NTP time is unavailable. If NTP time is unavailable, then Clients MAY use client-specific time.

6.2.8 ASUM Management Entity NTP Requirement

ASUM Management Entities SHALL also use time synchronized via NTP for time communications.

6.3 Client Information

6.3.1 ASUM Solutions Minimum Client Information Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL require the clients to report the following to the ASUM management entity, at a minimum:

- Software version details (e.g., version number)
- Client model indicator
- Supported clinical data interoperability protocol version
- Operating system version
- Current status (operational | graceful shutdown in progress | etc.)

6.3.2 ASUM Solutions Time Communicated Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL specify when the above information is to be shared: anytime there is communication, when requested, etc.

6.3.3 ASUM Solutions Additional Information Mechanism Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL provide mechanisms for clients to report any additional information, such as software or hardware dependencies and vendor-specific information.

6.4 Software Update Notification

6.4.1 ASUM Solutions Update Notification Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL ensure that an update notification includes: software image URL or URI, the authentication method (e.g. CVC), and related information (e.g. health system signature required).

6.4.2 ASUM Solutions Update Timeframe Requirement

For this iteration, ASUM solutions SHALL require clients to update within a specified timeframe. If the update does not happen within this timeframe, ASUM solutions SHALL require clients to refuse the update and respond with a failure status.

6.4.3 ASUM Solutions Rejection Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL allow clients to reject any notifications that are incomplete or incomprehensible. In addition, Annex C provides a list of management codes that the clients will use to report status updates related to ASUM.

6.5 Secure Software Transport

6.5.1 ASUM Solutions Software Image Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL require clients to securely obtain the software image over a mutually authenticated channel that protects data integrity. One potential solution is provided in Annex A

6.5.2 ASUM Solutions Vendor Specific Software Update Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL allow vendor-specific software update solutions that comply with these requirements. In the absence of compliant vendor specific solutions, ASUM solutions SHALL use the mechanism in Annex A or specify a conformant alternative.

6.6 Software Image Verification

6.6.1 ASUM Solutions Image Verification Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL require the ability to cryptographically verify the authenticated software update image as being sent by a valid source (e.g., manufacturer, health system, or both). ASUM solutions SHALL use the mechanism in Annex B, or provide a conformant alternative.

6.7 Software Update Status

6.7.1 ASUM Solutions Software Update Status Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL require clients to report the success or failure of software update attempts. ASUM solutions SHALL consider the following, at a minimum:

- Success: without issues | with warnings | with errors
- Failure

6.7.2 ASUM Solutions Update Status Additional Information Requirement

The ASUM solution SHALL allow the client to provide any additional information regarding errors and warnings. Here is a subset of errors to consider:

- Could not download image, incorrect URL
- Could not download image, mutual authentication failed
- Software image corrupted
- Software image could not be loaded
- Manufacturer signature (or equivalent indicator) not valid
- Manufacturer signature (or equivalent indicator) valid but not accepted according to provisioned policy (e.g., licensing)
- Health system signature (or equivalent indicator) not valid
- Health system signature (or equivalent indicator) valid but not accepted according to provisioned policy (e.g., licensing)
- Cause unknown

6.7.3 ASUM Solutions Revert to Operable State Requirement

ASUM solutions must recognize that there are cases when the client may require manual intervention due to irrecoverable issues. ASUM solutions SHALL mandate clients to revert an operable state in any case where the update was unsuccessful.

6.8 Hardware Updates

Hardware updates are currently out of scope for ASUM solutions.

6.9 Operating Systems

In this iteration, ASUM solutions will not consider or prohibit operating system updates to clients, except when they are tightly coupled with the application software component. In other words, third-party operating systems that are not co-compiled with the client application software component are out of scope. When tightly coupled, the vendor is responsible for including the operating system with software updates. Operating Systems that are not co-compiled with the application could still use this framework, but are not required to.

6.10 In-use Considerations

6.10.1 ASUM Solutions Client Update Identification Requirement

In this iteration, ASUM solutions SHALL NOT require clients to identify when they should, or should not, be updated. However, if clients have the ability to do so, ASUM solutions SHALL allow them to use these capabilities.

6.11 Client Considerations

6.11.1 Resource Constrained Requirement

ASUM solutions SHOULD consider clients that are resource constrained (e.g., battery operated clients) and in constrained environments (e.g., wireless clients).

7 Manufacturer Considerations Appendix

Many clients use commercial operating systems. Updates of these systems include not only package installation, but also license activation. A typical software update process would involve many steps, including (not necessarily in this precise order):

- acquisition of the software update package (typically through download)
- validation of compatibility and other requirements
- installation of software on base system
- installation software on all clients (which may also include operating system updates)
- license verification of license key with registration process (online or offline)
- configuration of system and applications (required if new features are included in the update)
- user training
- acceptance testing

Consequently, the requirements scope is extensive. The updates will be done with a standard PC type installation process which usually requires an installer (of course, some software installers run resident on their systems, which may be performance impacting and can increase the attack surface of the system). System upgrades may require multiple installations before a system is ready for service. Licensing and CMI certificate handling must be included with the installer, as must handling of OS dependencies. Not all target systems can access online license servers, which means other manual mechanisms (license keys or files) must be handled.

7.1 Complex Embedded Device Software Upgrade

Many devices are complex systems. A patient monitor, for example, has multiple subsystems and connects to a support server. The monitor may include a measurement rack with a dedicated CPU and measurement modules, each with dedicated microcontrollers. Some systems have integrated multi-measurement modules.
In typical current care environments, the support server will have a repository of all software components, including any supported revisions. Using the support server, a typical process would involve many steps, including (not necessarily in this precise order):

- verify device and software inventory, including software, hardware, and firmware versions of directly and indirectly connected system components
- verify component compatibility with upgrade
- validate license entitlements including software versions and device options (often device and even customer specific)
- determine available update options
- user selects upgrade option and starts upgrade process
- upgrade all affected components
- configuration data may need to be preserved or it may be preferable to reset depending on the nature of the update
- license servers and systems inventories need to be updated
- subsequent steps include formal acceptance testing, configuration updates (configure new features or even completely new configuration), and user training.

Clearly, this is more than simply a file transfer. The upgrade engine itself needs to be updated. Automation requires protocols to query internal components, track inventory and licensing, and manage upgrade states. Modular systems may need to update multiple packages at once or handle individual and possibly even dynamically built upgrades to single modules. Configuration updates and backups need to be included and some process for approving the device for safe use must be included.

7.2 Embedded Small Devices Upgrade

Small devices also need to be considered. These devices are not always networked. Those that are may have options beyond wired or wireless LAN such as Bluetooth, or even USB tethering to PC or other host. The bootloader on them may be very limited. Their memory and processing capability may be very minimal, as may be their battery capacity.

7.3 Summary of vendor considerations

Software update mechanisms vary because of device requirements, architecture, and service strategy. Dependencies include:

- Device requirements – cost, size, energy
- Device architecture – modularity, system compatibility
- Service strategy – licensing, service entitlements

Consequently, a stepwise roadmap approach seems appropriate. CMI might constrain scope to defining security requirements such as code signing, secure transfer process, and defining update trigger events. Implementation can, at least initially, be left open.

8 Secure Update Recommendations Appendix

Securing the software update mechanism helps prevent the threat of malicious software being installed. Malicious code may change a device's behavior or functions or allow new functions to be performed. For example, a common malware strategy is to make a system available to support Denial of Service (DoS) attacks of other network devices. In the health system, access and distribution of a patient's personal information may be a goal of attackers. It is easy to envision scenarios for successful attacks that may cause harm or death of patients.
Learning from other industry experiences, requirements that should be considered are:

- The medical device must verify that a software update download comes from a trusted source and has not been tampered with.
- The medical device must verify that the software loaded for execution during boot up is valid.
- Keys used for software validation must be securely stored, making it difficult for a hacker to gain access.
- Hospital IT staff must have the option of controlling software updates for medical devices on their network.
- Download is to be triggered by medical device periodic polling and initiation by management command from hospital IT staff.

Some control methods to consider for secure software update include:

- Software image for download signed by manufacturer with PKCS #7 digital signature using certificate PKI (CMI PKI)
    - Medical device verifies signature before accepting download
    - Could also be used for boot up validation
- Download protocols include HTTP(S), SFTP, FTPS, TFTP, and FTP. The protocol used should be easy to implement and should include encryption.
- Software image is co-signed by hospital IT staff when they are controlling updates.
- Triggering mechanism
    - Management messaging (SNMP, TR-069)
    - Provisioning config file settings (includes image co-sign requirement).

- Medical device periodically polls software image version status from network with proper client to server authentication and encryption.

9 Annex A: Secure Transport Mechanism

9.1 ASUM Solution Secure Transport Requirement

This section specifies a solution for secure software updates that meets the ASUM framework requirements. ASUM solutions SHALL require clients to support this, or another conformant secure transport option.

9.2 Secure Transport Disclosure Requirement

Conformant secure transport options SHALL be disclosed to demonstrate conformance using a worksheet provided by the Center and attested by a duly responsible party. The worksheet will be provided in the certification application.

9.3 Overview

The chosen secure transport mechanism is HTTP over TLS. The authentication leverages digital certificate-based identities that clients and other network elements are required to support with The Center's architecture.

In addition to securing the transport, the digital certificates are also used to authenticate the software image. This is accomplished via a digital signature using the private key of a Manufacture or Health System digital certificate's private key. This signature is then verified by the client, using the associated public key. The digital certificates and keys used must comply with The Center's identity requirements [CMI-SP-ID].

When the client is provided with a software update notification, the ASUM management entity provides an HTTPS URL and information regarding the certificate(s) to be used to authenticate the software image. The client then establishes a mutually authenticated HTTPS connection to retrieve the software image. It then verifies the digital signature prior to attempting an update. If the digital signature cannot be verified by the client, the client rejects the software image and reports the failure. If the digital signature is verified, then the Client attempts the software update. Further details on software image authentication (code signing and verification) is provided in Annex B.

9.4 Secure Transport Information in Update Notification

9.4.1 ASUM Solution HTTPS URL Requirement

ASUM solutions that utilize this secure software transport mechanism SHALL specify the HTTPS URL from where the client can obtain the software update and the digital certificate to use for authentication during a software update notification.

9.4.2 ASUM Client HTTPS URL Requirement

Clients SHALL reject any software update notification that does not provide an HTTPS URL

9.4.3 ASUM Client Digital Certificate Authentication Requirement

Clients SHALL also reject any update notification that does not specify the digital certificate to use for authentication.

9.5 Secure Transport Requirements

9.5.1 ASUM Client TLS 1.2 Requirement

Clients SHALL establish a TLS 1.2 [IETF-RFC5246] session in accordance with [CMI-SP-F-PF].

9.5.2 ASUM Client Default TCP Port Requirement

The client SHALL use the default TCP port of 443 unless reconfigured.

9.5.3 ASUM Client Supported Apllication Protocol Field Requirement

Clients SHALL only include HTTPS in the supported application protocols field of the ClientHello message of the TLS session.

9.5.4 ASUM Client TLS Session Reuse Requirement

TLS sessions MAY be re-used.

9.5.5 ASUM Client Obtain Software Image Requirement

Clients SHALL initiate the file transfer and use HTTP GET method to obtain the software image.

9.5.6 ASUM Client Mutually Authenticated TLS Requirement

Clients SHALL NOT download the software image from any TLS session that is not mutually authenticated.

9.6 Software Repository Guidelines

Software Repositories should follow [OWASP] guidelines for all implemented functionality. The software repository should not be implemented as a full web implementation. The Software Repository should implement the minimal functionality necessary to support this specification.

10 Annex B: Software Image Authentication

10.1 Manufacturer's Preparation of the Software Image

10.1.1 ASUM Client Signed Image Requirement

The Client's Manufacturer SHALL sign the software image (file) using a digital certificate that chains up to The Center's Code Verification Certificate (CVC).

10.1.2 ASUM Client Software Image Encryption Requirement

In addition to being signed, software files MAY be encrypted.

10.1.3 Out of Scope Notes

Encryption of software at rest is not in the current scope of this specification, though that functionality may be considered in the future.

The transfer of this software image from the manufacturer to the health system's software repository is currently out of scope for the ASUM framework.

10.1.4 ASUM Client Signed Image Header Requirement

The software files (images) SHALL have a signed image header. Image signature header contains certificates (including revocation details), signatures, and the file name of the software image.

10.1.5 ASUM Client Signature Header Requirement

The signature header MAY be appended to the software image, or conveyed as a separate file. If conveyed separately, the signature header SHALL contain the file name of the associated software image.

10.1.6 Example signed software image



10.1.7 ASUM Client SHA256 Signature Requirement

Signatures SHALL be produced using SHA256.

10.1.8 File Digest Signature Requirement

The file digest SHALL be signed using the CVC private key of the manufacturer (see [CMI-SP-ID]). Either RSA or ECC certificates and keys SHALL be used.

10.2 Guidelines for Health Systems's Preparation of the Software Image

If the Health System desires to add an additional layer of authentication, then the Health System must co-sign using a private key associated with a CVC digital certificate issued by the The Center's PKI. Accordingly, the Health System must append appropriate certificates and signatures to the signed image header. The Health System will create a digest of the software image and sign the digest, which will also be appended to the signed image header.

In addition to being signed, the health system must encrypt the software image. Encryption of software at rest is not in the current scope of this specification, though that functionality may be considered in the future.

10.3 Client Verification of Software Image

10.3.1 ASUM Client Software Image Verification Requirement

The Client SHALL verify the software image once it is downloaded before update is performed or any function is executed.

10.3.2 ASUM Client Update System Requirement

The Client SHALL attempt to update the system if the update is authorized and authentic.

10.3.3 ASUM Client Verification Order Requirement

Verification SHALL occur in the following order:

1. Certificates are verified (e.g., chained).
2. Revocation status is verified.
3. Software image digests are produced using SHA256.
4. If the Health System co-signed the software image, authorization is verified using the public key provided in the corresponding certificate and is compared against the digest.
5. The manufacturer signature is verified using the public key provided in the corresponding certificate and is compared against the digest.

10.4 Including Authentication and Encryption Information in the Software Update Notification

10.4.1 ASUM Solutions Authentication and Encryption Accommodation Requirement

ASUM solutions SHALL accommodate for the authentication and encryption requirements in the software update notification. Specifically, ASUM solutions SHALL allow for the following: manufacturer authentication method, presence of the health system authentication.

11 Annex C: Management Codes

11.1 ASUM Solutions Management Codes Requirement

[CMI-SP-F-PF] specifies a management framework and a management event format for events. ASUM solutions SHALL utilize this management framework and the code format. In addition, to ensure resiliency within ASUM solutions a set of additional conditions and event codes are specified below. ASUM solutions SHALL implement these events.

11.2 ASUM Solutions Additional Codes Requirement

ASUM solutions MAY also enhance this set of events.

11.3 ASUM Codes Table

	ID	DESCRIPTION	ADDITIONAL DETAILS	OPTIONAL TEXT	NEXT STEPS
S	**00000**	Software update successful	No errors or warnings	none	none
E	**00001**	ASUM management entity connection failure @ L2/L3	L2 or L3 error	share addl info (e.g., ICMP error), if available	backoff/retry
E	**00002**	ASUM management entity connection failure @ L4 Error	(i.e. firewall misconfiguration, etc)	share addl info, if available	backoff/retry
E	**00003**	ASUM management entity connection failure @ L4 NACK		share addl info, if available	backoff/retry
E	**00004**	ASUM management entity connection failure @ Auth	Authentication failed	share authentication identity or other information, if supported	backoff/retry
E	**00005**	ASUM management entity connection failure @ session establishment	Session establishment failed	share addl details, if available	backoff/retry

	ID	DESCRIPTION	ADDITIONAL DETAILS	OPTIONAL TEXT	NEXT STEPS
E	**00006**	ASUM management entity ACK failure	When Signaling (e.g., MEM DMC) ACK is required and is not received	share addl details, if available	backoff/retry
S	**00010**	Software update successfully requested	Software update request looks good	share addl details, if available	none
S	**00011**	Software update cancellation by ASUM management entity successful	ASUM Management entity cancelled software update	none	none
E	**00012**	Software update cancellation by ASUM management entity failed	Client could not process cancellation of software update	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00020**	Software update request rejected: URL/URI error	Client checks the format and determines errors (if supported)	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00021**	Software update request rejected: Authentication details erroneous	Client checks the authentication details and determines errors (if supported)	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00022**	Software update request rejected: unspecified error	Client determines errors not explicitly called out	share addl details, if available	None
W	**00030**	Software update not attempted; client in use		share addl details, if available	none
E	**00060**	Software update rejected during timeframe; client in use		share addl details, if available	none
E	**00080**	Image Download failure; incorrect URL/URI	Service unavailable	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00081**	Image Download failure; could not connect to software repository	Communication Error	share addl details, if available	backoff/retry
E	**00082**	Image Download failure; authentication error	Mutual authentication while attempting software image	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00083**	Image Download failure; download interrupted erroneously	Download failures, e.g., connection reset	share addl details, if available	backoff/retry
E	**00120**	System Update Failed; Software image corrupted	Software image could not be loaded	share addl details, if available	backoff/retry

	ID	DESCRIPTION	ADDITIONAL DETAILS	OPTIONAL TEXT	NEXT STEPS
E	**00121**	System Update Failed; manufacture authentication failed	e.g., signature invalid	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00122**	System Update Failed; health system authentication failed	e.g., signature invalid	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00123**	System Update Failed; license validation failed	client recognizes unuauthorized image	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00124**	System Update Failed; Software image could not be loaded		share addl details, if available	none
E	**00125**	System Update Failed; Upgrade not compatible with system		share addl details, if available	none
E	**00126**	System Update Failed; System policy prevents upgrade		share addl details, if available	none
E	**00127**	System Update Failed; update availability timed out	Update could not be completed within the time window	share addl details, if available	none
E	**00128**	System Update Failed; unspecified error		Share addl details specific info	vendor specific
S	**00129**	System Update Success; no known operational errors	Everything A-OK	share addl details, if available	none
I	**00130**	System Update Success; system set to factory details	System reset to factory defaults	share addl details, if available	none
S	**00140**	Configuration interval change request successful	These are used when the ASUM solution uses a heartbeat approach, and a periodicity change is requested	none	none
E	**00141**	Configuration interval change request failed	These are used when the ASUM solution uses a heartbeat approach, and a periodicity change is requested	none	none
S	**00150**	Management entity change request successful	ASUM management entity modification request	none	none

	ID	DESCRIPTION	ADDITIONAL DETAILS	OPTIONAL TEXT	NEXT STEPS
E	**00151**	Management entity change request failed	ASUM management entity modification request	none	none

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